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CASE NOTES
necessarily involves speculation as to what factors influenced the
Justices. The Glaxo decision, however, does appear to be consistent
with the Court's current view of the interrelationships of patents and
antitrust policy. It flows from a realization that patents are an area
of exempt conduct within the general sweep of antitrust policy. It is
further evidence of the Court's explicit policy, recently expressed in
Lear and Blonder, of favoring the judicial testing of patents.
Perhaps most important about the decision is the emphasis which
the Court places on insuring that the antitrust decree is effective in
restoring competitive conditions once violations are found. Coupled
with this emphasis is a reaffirmation that the Supreme Court plays a
special role in antitrust litigation. This decision would appear to arm
the United States with a potentially potent new tool in handling
antitrust cases.
PETER A. MULLIN
Trade Secrets—Federal Patent Law Preemption of State Trade
Secret Law—Kewanee Oil Co. v. Myron Corp.'—In an action by
Kewanee Oil Company to enjoin Bicron Corporation and several
individual defendants from disclosing and/or using alleged trade
secrets2 in which Kewanee had a claimed property right, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the grant of a permanent injunction by the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio and remanded for dismissal
on the grounds that Ohio state trade secret law3
 was preempted by
the United States patent laws. 4
Bicron Corporation was formed by former employees of an
unincorporated subordinate division of Kewanee, the Harshaw
Chemical Company, which manufactures various types of synthetic
crystals. As a condition of employment with Harshaw, each of the
individual defendants had executed at least one agreement prohibit-
ing him from disclosing confidential information or trade secrets
obtained as an employee. In 1949 Harshaw began research on the
manufacture of sodium iodide thallium activated scintillation crys-
tals, which have a unique property permitting them to generate a
' 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S. Ct. 70, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct.
9, 1973) (No. 187).
2
 Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b (1939) reads in pertinent part:
Definition of trade secret. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers,
	 .	 A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the
operation of the business.
Under Ohio law, an employee or former employee can be enjoined from disclosing or
using, for either his own or his new employer's benefit, trade secrets secured in the course of
confidential employment. Curry v. Marquart, 133 Ohio St. 77, 79, 11 N,E.2d 868, 869 (1937),
.35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
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minute particle of light when struck by ionizing radiations By 1966,
after more than sixteen years of research, Harshaw was able to grow
a seventeen inch crystal, an achievement no competitor had
accomplished. 6 Bicron, in contrast, came out with a seventeen inch
crystal within nine months of the formation of the company.
Kewanee thereupon brought an action to enjoin disclosure and/or
use of forty alleged trade secrets used in the manufacture of the
crystals.' The district court found that the individual defendants
had, for Bicron's benefit, used secrets, processes, procedures and
manufacturing techniques obtained while working for Harshaw,
that twenty of the forty alleged trade secrets were protectable, and
that there was no sufficient basis for a conclusion that Harshaw's
failure to maintain adequate security constituted a waiver of
secrecy. 8
 Kewanee conceded that the trade secrets relating to the
processes, procedures and manufacturing techniques were "patent-
able," i.e., able to be patented under the provisions of the federal
patent law, 9
 had they not been in commercial use for over a year
and thus no longer eligible for patents."
Kewanee appealed, claiming that all forty alleged trade secrets
were protectable, while Bicron and the individual defendants
cross-appealed, claiming that none of the forty should have been
protected under state law. The issue of a possible conflict between
(1) the patent clause of the United States Constitution" and federal
patent laws and (2) the trade secret law of Ohio was also raised. The
Sixth Circuit upheld the findings of fact of the district court regard-
ing the trade secrets, but HELD: that Ohio's trade secret law cannot
be applied to protect an inventor in the maintenance of a monopoly
over a device which is an appropriate subject for patent under the
federal patent laws and which has been used commercially for more
than one year since the state law is then in conflict with the policies
and purposes of those patent laws.' 2
5
 The crystals are used in connection with nuclear fission equipment utilized in geophysi-
cal surveys searching for uranium and oil, in clinical measurement of radio isotopes, and in
certain aspects of space exploration.
6 478 F.2d at 1076.
7 Id.
a Id. at 1077. "Mhe absence of sufficient precautions can forfeit secrecy. . . [Clourts
find in some cases that a secret process which is employed in a plant with little or no measures
to keep it from public view ceases to be a secret." R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets § 2.04, at 2-17
(Supp. 1973) (footnote omitted).
9
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970): "Inventions patentable. Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title."
1° 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970): "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the
invention was . in public use ... more than one year prior to the date of the application for
patent . . . ."
" The applicable constitutional provision, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, gives Congress the
power "No promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .."
12 478 F.2d at 1086.
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This note will first discuss the bases for and policies underlying
state trade secret law and federal patent law, and then analyze the
specific fact situation in Kewanee in light of relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions and a holding contrary to Kewanee in a
Second Circuit decision. 13
 It will be submitted that the Sixth Circuit
arrived at an improvident decision which may have far-reaching
and detrimental repercussions in industries dependent on the com-
petitive edge provided by trade secrets.
The conflicts between state trade secret law and federal patent
law are genuine and serious. Trade secret law is rooted in the
common law of contract and torts; among the numerous legal
theories on which trade secret cases rely are breach of contract
(express or implied agreement not to disclose), violation of fiduciary
duty, infringement of property rights, breach of confidence, and
misappropriation." Trade secret law protects the individual first
and the public only incidentally. Patent law, on the other hand,
gives precedence to the public interest through its goals of encour-
agement of invention and disclosure of ideas to the public."' It
seems reasonable, if perhaps somewhat facile, to characterize trade
secret law as promoting fairness and morality in relationships, while
characterizing patent law as promoting freedom in competition by
encouraging inventors to disclose their ideas to the public. Unfortu-
nately, these two laudable policies come into conflict when, in an
effort to enforce fairness, the policy underlying the federal patent
law is frustrated. When the conflict is clear the state law must
bow."
In a discussion of the policy arguments in favor of upholding
state trade secret law, it is necessary to view the evolution of such
law in an historical perspective. Two nineteenth century landmark
cases in the exposition of federal patent policy, Grant v. Raymond"
and Kendall v. Winsor," were relied upon heavily by the Sixth
Circuit in its argument that federal patent law provides the exclu-
sive means and remedies for the protection of inventors. However,
dormant in an historical argument for preemption of trade secret
law are the spores of that argument's refutation. The two early cases
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
14 See Marmorek, The Inventor's Common Law Rights Today, 50 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 369,
373-74 (1968).
15 "It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors
was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public ..
was . . . doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly." Kendall v.
Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858).
U.S. Coast. art. VI:
. . . This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
17 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832).
18 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858).
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relied on were decided well before the case now widely recognized as
the basis of much trade secret law." As the Kewanee court noted,
trade secret law did not develop until the middle of the nineteenth
century. 02
 Rapidly burgeoning technology created the need for such
a body of law, a need which has steadily grown. These changing
realities were recognized by the Supreme Court in a series of opin-
ions written during the first half of this century in which trade secret
protection was expressly approved. 21 And significantly, the historic
cases most often cited as standing for preemption of state protective
Iaw all dealt with matter in the public domain; 22 these decisions
were in accord with the common law view of trade secrets, under
which protection is not afforded to articles in the public domain. 23
This line of decisions addressing the conflict between state
protective law and federal patent law has culminated in three Sup-
reme Court cases: Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 24 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 25 and Sears' companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. 26
 As will be shown, however, these decisions
involved a degree of preemption far short of that found in Kewanee,
in which the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on broad dicta in Sears and
Lear which were intended to shore up the necessarily narrow hold-
ings in those cases but were never meant to emasculate state trade
secret law. In Sears, Sears, Roebuck & Company marketed a pole
lamp substantially identical to one originated and sold by Stiffel
Company and on which Stiffel had obtained both design and
mechanical patents. Stiffel brought an action predicated upon both
patent infringement and—because of confusion in the trade as to the
source of the lamps—unfair competition. The district court found
the patents invalid for want of novelty, 27 but, under the Illinois
unfair competition law, enjoined Sears from copying the lamps. 28
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed,
9 Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868). The earliest American case to recognize
trade secret protection was Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837).
20 478 F.2d at 1081.
21 Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); Board of Trade v. Christie
Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250 (1905).
22 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
23 Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b (1939):
Secrecy. The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of public
knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as
his secret. Matters which are completely disclosed by the goods which one markets
cannot be his secret.
24 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
25 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
26 376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964). Because the fact situations in
Sears and Compco are so similar, only Sears is discussed in detail infra. The doctrine for
which the cases stand is often referred to as the "Sears and Compco" doctrine.
27 See Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 117-18 (7th Cir. 1963). The
opinion of the district court is unreported.
21I See 376 U.S. at 226.
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holding that since the lamp could not be protected by the invalid
patent, it was in the public domain and could be made and sold by
anyone. If state law were allowed to prohibit copying, the Court
reasoned, it could allow perpetual protection to articles either al-
together unpatentable under federal constitutional standards or on
which the patents had expired, 29
 and under those circumstances the
state law could not stand. 3 ° The Sears decision was in accord with
trade secret common law, which does not extend protection to
matter in the public domain. 31 The result of allowing the state law
to stand would have been to give an effective state patent in per-
petuity to an article in the public domain. However, en route to this
decision the Court made the following statements upon which the
court in Kewanee relied:
Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent
laws directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that
forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind
that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws.
• . . To allow a State by use of its law of unfair
competition to prevent the copying of an article which
represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to
permit the State to block off from the public something
which federal law has said belongs to the public. . . .
. . But because of the federal patent laws a State
may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopy-
righted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award
damages for such copying. 32
It will be later submitted that the Sixth Circuit misapplied the above
dicta when it failed to distinguish between ideas and products which
are in the public domain and those which are not. 33
 The pole lamps
in question in Sears were in the public domain because they had
been the subjects of patents later found invalid. When the patents
were issued, their subject matter became public knowledge because
of the disclosure requirement of the patent laws. Once the patents
were found invalid, the public was no longer bound by the
seventeen-year monopoly the patent owner holds, and was free to
copy them.
While the Sears decision was not inimical to the policies under-
lying state trade secret law, the decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins 34
was. Adkins was hired by Lear in 1952 to develop gyroscopes to
29 Id. at 231-32.
30 Although the Court did not expressly strike down the Illinois unfair competition law,
it made it clear that it could not be applied to the lamps in Sears.
31 See note 23 supra.
32 376 U.S. at 231-33.
33 See text at note 54 infra.
34 345 U.S. 653 (1969).
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meet the increasingly demanding standards of modern planes. His
inventions were to remain his and Lear was to pay royalties on a
mutually satisfactory basis. A detailed contract was executed in 1955
in which Lear agreed to continue to pay royalties, but retained a
right to terminate in the event the Patent Office refused to issue
patents to Adkins or in case the patents issued were later invali-
dated. Adkins' patent applications were twice rejected, and in 1957
Lear refused to pay any more royalties on the bulk of the gyroscopes
manufactured, claiming that it had uncovered an expired patent
that anticipated Adkins' invention. However, a patent was issued to
Adkins in 1960 and he then brought suit in state court in California
for accrued royalties. Lear claimed invalidity of the patent as a
defense, but the California court invoked the doctrine of licensee
estoppel to prevent Lear from contesting the patent. 35 The United
States Supreme Court discarded the estoppel doctrine, 36 holding
that a licensee is not estopped from challenging the patent underly-
ing his license, and went on to hold that payment of royalties may
be suspended pending judgment on the validity of the patent. 37 On
pure contract principles it would seem that payments of royalties
would be enforced, but the Court noted the balancing process neces-
sitated by the fact situation:
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heav-
ily when they are balanced against the important public
interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of
ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.
Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an
inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may
continually be required to pay tribute to would-be
monopolists without need or justification. We think it plain
that the technical requirements of contract doctrine must
give way before the demands of the public interest in the
typical situation involving the negotiation of a license after
a patent has issued."
The Court also said:
The uncertain status of licensee estoppel in the case law is
a product of judicial efforts to accommodate the competing
demands of the common law of contracts and the federal
law of patents. On the one hand, the law of contracts
forbids a purchaser to repudiate his promises simply be-
cause he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargain he has
3
' Under the doctrine of licensee estoppel, "the licensee under a patent license agreement
may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties due under the
contract." Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950).
36
 The Supreme Court in Lear specifically overruled Automatic Radio. 395 U.S. at 671.
37 Id. at 674.
" Id. at 670.
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made. On the other hand, federal law requires that all
ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common
good unless they are protected by a valid patent. 39
Although the Court was unequivocal in setting aside the fairness of
contract doctrine in favor of the freedom of competition that will
presumably result from the disclosure and release of a new idea, the
holding nevertheless was limited to ideas "in general circulation" by
virtue of the public disclosure inherent in the issuance of a patent.
Although the Supreme Court did not deal directly with trade
secrets in either Sears or Lear, it may soon be faced squarely with
the issue. The Sixth Circuit noted in Kewanee that four other
circuits have failed to find a conflict between state trade secret law
and federal patent law." The Second Circuit addressed the issue of
possible conflict in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.'" Painton was a
British corporation which signed a series of agreements with Bourns
to obtain techniques used in manufacturing potentiometers. When
Bourns refused to renew the agreements, Painton refused to return
certain alleged trade secret matter. Painton sought a declaration that
it was free to keep and use the information permanently. The
district court held that Painton was not required to make any future
payments for use of the techniques for which Bourns had no patent
application pending, since the federal patent policy of strict regula-
tion of inventions would be undercut if inventors could enforce
agreements for secret ideas without being required to submit those
ideas to the Patent Office and eventually disclose them to the
public. 42
 The Second Circuit reversed in a decision that carefully
analyzed the district court opinion. Because of the similar policy
arguments in the Painton district court and Kewanee opinions, it is
worthwhile to examine the Second Circuit's analysis in Painton.
The Second Circuit saw the view of the district court as resting
on two different theories: (1) the dissent in the Lear case, which left
open the question of the enforceability of a contract requiring pay-
ments for disclosure of an invention while a patent was pending,
and (2) a policy argument that protecting trade secrets in advance of
filing patent applications is contrary to federal patent policy because
it will discourage such applications. 43
 The district court argument
under the first theory was that state recognition of an agreement
39
 Id. at 668 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
'0
 478 F.2d at 1079, citing Servo Corp. v, General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1964), rehearing denied, 342 F.2d 993 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934, rehearing denied,
384 U.S. 914 (1966); Dekar Industries, Inc. v. I3issett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410
F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
41
 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
42 309 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
43
 442 F.2d at 223. It should be noted that neither the Painton district court nor the
Sixth Circuit in Kewanee expressly based its opinion on these two theories; the Second Circuit
in Painton extrapolated them from the lower court decision.
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requiring payment for trade secrets during its term, with a cessation
of use upon expiration, would run afoul of Sears and Compca in that
state laws prohibiting the copying of articles not protected by valid
patents but offered for public sale were inconsistent with federal
patent law. The Second Circuit pointed out that Sears was inappli-
cable since the state law at issue in Sears did in fact confer a
monopoly against copying an article otherwise in the public domain,
a monopoly good against non-contractors just as a patent would
have been. But while the state statute invalidated in Sears gave the
same protection a patent would have, without the patent's
safeguards and time limit, an agreement licensing trade secrets is
altogether different from a patent in that it binds no one but the
licensee. All others are, as the licensee previously was, free to figure
out the secret. Rather than effectively creating a monopoly, as did
the Sears state statute, the upholding of private agreements for the
sharing of trade secrets on mutually acceptable terms discourages
the owner from hoarding them."
Regarding the second theory, the district court in Painton
reasoned that, under Lear, once a patent was issued the patentee
could not force an unwilling licensee to pay royalties until and unless
the patent was determined valid. Thus, an inventor might refrain
from applying for a patent if allowed to benefit from a trade secret
license, and the public would then be deprived of an invention. The
Second Circuit analyzed this theory by dividing trade secrets into
three categories: (1) those believed by the owner to be validly pat-
entable inventions, (2) those known by the owner to be unpatenta-
ble, and (3) those whose patentability is dubious. The court reasoned
that the first category would be an unlikely source of deterrence to
owners of trade secrets seeking patents in view of the overwhelming
likelihood that the secure protections of a patent would command a
higher price from a prospective licensee than would a license of
unpatented know-how, the protection of which is uncertain even
where the license is exclusive. Among the factors making licensing
of mere know-how less attractive to prospective licensors than
would be licensing of patented matter are the possibility of a leak
which would make the secret public, forfeiture of the right to obtain
a patent after a year, 45 and the right of another inventor to claim the
patent if he can prove that the prior inventor concealed the
disco very. 46 The Painton court therefore concluded that any conflict
between patent policy and trade secret agreements is readily re-
solved not by refusing to enforce the agreements, but by refusing to
44 Id.
45 35 U.S.C. § 102 {1970), quoted in part at note 10 supra.
46 35 U.S.C.	 102(g) (1970) entitles a person to a patent unless "before the applicant's
invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it. . 	 . "
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grant or uphold a patent when an inventor unduly delays his appli-
cation after the invention is put to use. 47 The court thought that the
second category offered even less reason to invalidate trade secret
agreements, since there is no public interest in encouraging a flood
of patent applications for inventions which even the inventors be-
lieve to be unpatentable. 48
 In the third category the court conceded
that a rule invalidating trade secret agreements might tend to stimu-
late patent applications, but was unwilling to concede that the effect
would necessarily be beneficial. If a patent does not issue, there will
have been unnecessary postponement in the divulging of the trade
secret to those willing to pay for it. If it does issue and is invalid,
nevertheless many will prefer to pay modest royalties rather than to
contest it, even though Lear allows prospective licensees to accept a
license and claim patent invalidity without having to pay royalties
during the course of the action. The result in such a case would be
that numerous patent licensees unwilling to go through the time and
expense of litigation would be paying unjustified royalties, while
under trade secret law a smaller, but willing, number of licensees
would be paying royalties." The court summed up by stating that it
did not find, either in general considerations of public policy or in
emanations from federal patent law, a sufficient basis for declining
to enforce even the royalty provisions of trade secret agreements, at
least with respect to those cases in which no patent application had
been filed.
Several factors differentiate Kewanee from both Sears and Lear
and favor the approach taken in Painton. The Sixth Circuit charac-
terized the protection provided by the Ohio trade secret law as a
"monopoly,"50
 and took at face value Kewanee's concession that one
of the principal purposes of maintaining the secrecy of their inven-
tions as opposed to seeking patents was to extend the "commercial
monopoly" of the invention beyond the seventeen years granted by
the federal patent laws. 5 ' The court even framed the issue presented
in terms of whether "the patent laws of the United States preempt
the field of law relating to monopolies to be granted to inventors." 52
It is indeed true that if no one else discovered Kewanee's secrets,
Ohio law would give them perpetual protection, while the federal
limit on such protection is seventeen years. However, although the
47 35 U.S.C. ♦ 102 (1970), quoted in part at note 10 supra.
48
 442 F,2d at 224.
49 Id. at 225.
5" 478 F.2d at 1079.
S ' "Every patent shall contain . . . a grant . . . for the term of seventeen years ... of the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States . . ." 35 U,S.C. § 154 (1970),
52
 478 F.2d at 1079 (emphasis added).
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patent laws do in fact confer a temporary monopoly, the state law at
issue in Kewanee did nothing more than prevent the individual
defendants, and through them Bicron, from breaching an explicit
term of their employment contracts by using or disclosing the trade
secrets learned during their employment. The only persons pre-
vented from using the secrets were those who contracted with
Kewanee not to so use them. The public at large may discover the
secrets either independently or through "reverse engineering" 53 and
use them freely, a situation that can hardly be called a monopoly in
the same class with the absolute, if temporally limited, protection
granted under the terms of a patent.
A second factor distinguishing Kewanee from Sears and Lear is
the fact that the alleged trade secrets in the former case were not in
the public domain, while the product and knowledge in the latter
two cases were. The Sixth Circuit quoted extensively from both
cases to bolster the proposition that matter unprotected by federal
patent cannot be granted state protection from being copied. This is
both logical and fair as concerns matters in the public domain, but
highly questionable in regard to undisclosed matters. Patentees, as
in Sears and Lear, are required to make public disclosure of the
contents of their patents upon issuance and take the risk that the
patents may later be invalidated. 54 In exchange for that disclosure,
however, they are given a seventeen-year monopoly on their patent.
In Kewanee, none of the alleged trade secrets were patented or
otherwise available to the public, and conversely, Kewanee had no
recourse against the public should someone honestly learn the se-
crets. In sum, the distinctions between Sears and Lear and the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Kewanee are significant enough, in regard to the
issues of monopoly and public domain, to render highly questionable
the applicability of those Supreme Court decisions to Kewanee.
Another difficulty presented by Kewanee is the emphasis placed
by the Sixth Circuit on the patentability of the trade secrets. Two
possible interpretations of the opinion arise as a result: (1) a narrow
one in which only patentable matter will be excluded from state law
protection, and (2) a broad one in which neither patentable nor
unpatentable matter will be protected. In support of the view that
the Sixth Circuit intended its decision to be interpreted narrowly is
the fact that in its process of narrowing the issue, the court stressed
that the trade secrets were appropriate subjects for patentability
and, having been in public use for over a year, were no longer able
53
 "Reverse engineering" is the technique of studying the marketed product, which is
clearly in the public domain, and attempting to deduce the trade secret from it.
54
 The subject matter of an invalid patent is in the public domain. See Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964).
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to be patented. An acceptance of this narrow interpretation requires
that a distinction be made between patentable and unpatentable
matter. It is submitted that such a distinction is illogical. If state
trade secret law were allowed to protect unpatentable but not pat-
entable matter, it would create the situation of having matter lack-
ing in novelty enjoying protection while patentable matter, which
presumably is novel, would not be protected. Since the ultimate
determination of whether an invention is in fact patentable is made
when the patent's validity is tested in court, any characterization of
a trade secret as either patentable or unpatentable is itself extremely
difficult prior to litigation. As the Court said in Lear:
A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal
conclusion reached by the Patent Office. Moreover, the
legal conclusion is predicated on factors as to which
reasonable men can differ widely. Yet the Patent Office is
often obliged to reach its decision in an ex parte proceed-
ing, without the aid of the arguments which could be
advanced by parties interested in proving patent
invalidity. 55
Under the above interpretation of Kewanee, the owner of a trade
secret of questionable patentability will be in a quandary. If, in a
wrongful disclosure suit, his trade secret is found patentable, it can
no longer be protected. If he seeks a patent which is later held
invalid, he is in an identical position. If the trade secret is held
unpatentable, it is then protectable; in a similar manner a valid
patent would be protected. Under this interpretation of Kewanee no
premium is put on seeking a patent since the risks in either situation
are roughly the same, thus undercutting the public policy of disclo-
sure of inventions, a policy the Sixth Circuit clearly supports. Upon
concluding that it is illogical to have trade secret law protection of
unpatentable but not of patentable matter, two alternatives remain:
either both should be protected or neither should be. It is submitted
that both categories should be protected, at least with respect to
matter not in the public domain.
Since the Sixth Circuit will not allow state trade secret law to
protect patentable matter, and in view of the illogic of protecting
unpatentable but not patentable matter, a more likely interpretation
of Kewanee is the broad one—that the Sixth Circuit will refuse to
protect unpatentable matter as well as patentable when an appro-
priate case is presented. The court's concentration on "patentability"
may have simply been part of the process of narrowing the issue; the
tenor of the opinion indicates further preemption to come. The
result of the broad' interpretation would be to render state trade
secret law nothing more than an adjunct to federal patent law; state
55 395 U.S. at 670.
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law might ultimately be limited to protection of secrets during the
period between the filing of a patent application and the issuance of
a patent or the final rejection of an application. 56
 This is not a
desirable result. Aside from the immediate harm a virtually blanket
invalidation of state trade secret law would wreak—such as a sub-
stantial shift in the international balance of trade 57 and failures of
low-capitalized businesses dependent on income derived primarily
from licensing their trade secrets58—the long-term results would
work against the federal policy, enunciated in the Constitution, of
promoting the useful sciences. 59 Absent some assurance, short of one
entailing the complexities and expenses of applying for a patent, that
an inventor's results will be safe from competitive appropriation,
there is likely to be far less incentive to invest large amounts of
money in research, with an attendant decline in technological pro-
gress. This extreme result is clearly undesirable. Balanced against
the factors favoring trade secret protection is the possibility that it
will restrict the free exchange of ideas and stifle innovation which
would occur through inventors building upon these secrets. 6 ° The
extreme case is that of the potentially perpetual secret, i.e., one not
susceptible to reverse engineering or to discovery by other than
wrongful means. While this possibility exists, the result is no differ-
ent from that of a situation in which an inventor chooses never to
use or disclose his discovery, choices he is perfectly free to make.
The public receives at least a limited benefit when the inventor
markets the results of his secret even though he does not disclose the
secret itself.
The differences between the approaches of the Sixth Circuit
and those of the other circuits that have passed on the issue of
federal patent law preemption of state trade secret law—the Second
Circuit in particular—appear irreconcilable. Although either legisla-
tive or judicial action could presumably resolve the conflict, a legis-
lative solution appears unlikely, since Congress recently failed to act
56
 Even this remnant of state trade secret law would be eliminated if the preemption was
viewed as arising under the negative implications of the patent clause of the Constitution
rather than being merely in conflict with the patent laws as enacted by Congress. In such a
case, all state trade secret law might be invalidated as unconstitutional. On the other hand, if
preemption were based solely on a conflict with the patent laws, Congress presumably could
cure the conflict with legislation. See Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and
Compco Cases, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 83 (1964).
5 ' See Brief for R. Milgrim as Amicus Curiae at n.6, Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442
F,2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971), reprinted in R. Milgrim, supra note 8, § 7.0812], at 7-70.9. Milgrim
estimates annual royalties paid by foreign licensees to domestic licensors for trade secrets at $1
billion.
58
 See Brief, supra note 57, § 111.5.
59 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, quoted in note 11 supra.
6° Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust
Supremacy, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1432, 1461 (1967). Also mentioned is the restrictive effect trade
secret law has on employees' mobility, in that they would be prevented from using much of
their knowledge with a new employer, assuming their expertise consisted largely of trade
secrets. Id. at 1462.
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affirmatively to clarify the relationship between state trade secret
law and federal patent policy. 6 ' In light of this, it is submitted that a
definitive determination by the Supreme Court of the permissible
parameters of state trade secret law in light of the federal patent law
is necessary to alleviate the uncertainty under which trade secret-
dependent industries now operate. 62
 Since the Second Circuit's
approach—retention of state trade secret law and the protection it
affords—appears to be most reasonable and responsive to industrial
realities, it is further submitted that such determination should be
made in favor of recognizing that vigorous state trade secret law can
coexist with federal patent law and is compatible with both the
constitutional patent policy and the exercise of the patent power by
Congress.
RANDOLPH H. ELKINS
Securities—Insiders' Liability Under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act for Stock Transfer After Corporate Merger—Kern
County hind Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. '—On May 8,
1967, Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Occidental) announced a
tender offer to purchase 500,000 shares of the stock of Kern County
Land Company (Old Kern). 2 The tender offer expired June 8, 1967.
Occidental offered to buy at a price roughly one-third higher than
the current market price.' Within two days Occidental had received
more than 500,000 shares. It extended its offer, and by June 30
owned 887,549 shares. 4 In the course of this period, Occidental
61
 A recent Senate bill that would have expressly rejected federal preemption of trade
secret law failed in committee. See R. Milgrim, supra note 8, § 7.08, at 7-70.8(2) n.56.26,
7-70.8(17) n.56.28 for background. On the other hand, Congress has not seen fit, in the
present laws or elsewhere, to assert such preemption, and in fact has recognized the need for
trade secret protection in numerous acts setting guidelines for their handling by administrative
bodies. See R. Milgrim, supra, ch. 6 for an extensive discussion of the federal acts referring to
trade secrets.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari. 94 S. Ct. 70, 42 U,S.L,W. 3194 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1973) (No. 187).
411 U.S. 582 (1973).
2 Occidental had previously attempted a merger with Old Kern, but had been rejected by
Kern's board. Occidental made the tender bid in the hope that ownership of a large block of
stock would make Old Kern amenable to merger. Abrams v, Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323
F. Supp. 570, 572-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
After the reorganization which followed, Kern County Land Co. became known as 600
California Corp. until its dissolution on Oct. 6, 1967. 411 U.S. at 584 n.2. Kern County Land
Co. (New Kern), a Delaware corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corp,,
itself a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc. Id. at 586 & n.10.
3 Old Kern closed at 63341 on the last trading day before the tender offer; Occidental
offered $83.50 plus $1.50 brokerage payment. 411 U.S. at 584, 585 n.5.
4
 This figure included 1900 shares which Occidental had purchased on the open market
in April 1967. 323 F. Supp. at 573-74. "Beneficial ownership" status was not asserted as to
those shares. 411 U.S. at 585 n.7.
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